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Economic sociology is a term that was rarely heard a decade ago but which has become 
quite popular again. Today sociology departments get ranked according to their 
prominence in this field, and a respectable number of articles and books that label 
themselves “economic sociology” appear every year. While the standard definition of 
economic sociology – the application of the sociological perspective to economic 
phenomena – shows that economic sociologists are primarily interested in analyzing the 
economy and its main institutions, a quick look at some representative studies show that 
these often include a political dimension in the analysis. This goes for the classics – 
Marx, Weber, Schumpeter – as well as for recent studies in economic sociology (e.g.  
Fligstein 1990, Evans 1995, Beckert 2004). 
To analyze what happens at the interface between politics and economics is clearly not 
the exclusive task of economic sociology; it also is something that e.g. political economy 
does. An important difference, however, is that political economy currently draws on a 
type of analysis that is deeply influenced by analytical economics. Political economy, in 
contrast to contemporary economic sociology, makes use of a variety of economic ideas, 
such as constitutional economics, game theory and so on. One may even define the field 
of political economy as the logic of economics applied to political phenomena. 
In this brief paper I will argue that economic sociology would do well to follow the 
example of political economy in this respect and pay more attention to analytical 
economics and its ideas. Contemporary economic sociology, I argue, focuses far too 
much on social relations and views the impact of these as the explanation to most of 
what happens in the economy. What is wrong with this approach is that it disregards the 
importance of interests or the forces that drive human behavior, not least in the 
economy. What needs to be done – and this will be the red thread throughout this 
paper – is to combine social relations and interests in one and the same analysis. If we 
do this, I argue, we may be able to unite some of the basic insights from economics, 
with some of the basic insights from sociology (e.g. Swedberg 2003).  
                                            
1 Cornell University, Department of Sociology, rs328@cornell.edu 
 3
As opposed to modern economics, economic sociology does not have a core of basic 
concepts and ideas, welded together over a long period of time. Instead economic 
sociology, mirroring sociology itself, consists of a number of competing perspectives, 
some more coherent than others. Many economic sociologists, for example, draw on 
social constructivist perspective, others on a Weberian perspective; some follow Mark 
Granovetter in emphasizing embeddedness, others Pierre Bourdieu in approaching the 
analysis of the economy with the concepts of field, habitus and different types of capital. 
The reader who is interested in an introduction to these different perspectives is 
referred to The Handbook of Economc Sociology (Smelser and Swedberg 1994; second 
edition forthcoming in 2005). In what follows I shall first discuss two of the most 
important concepts in modern economic sociology – embeddedness (including networks) 
and field. I will then proceed to a discussion of two concepts that I argue should be at 
the center of contemporary economic sociology: a sociological concept of interest and 
an interest-based concept of institutions.  
         
# 1 Embeddedness (including networks)  
The most famous concept in today’s economic sociology is by far that of embeddedness. 
While the term itself can be found in the work of Karl Polanyi, it was rarely used by him 
and had to wait till the 1980s and Mark Granovetter to be thrust into prominence. While 
the centrality of embeddedness to what has become known as “new economic 
sociology” (mid-1980s-) is beyond doubt, its analytical status is, on the other hand, 
contested. While some see it as a useful tool with which to show what is distinctive 
about the sociological approach to the economy, a number of economic sociologists also 
question its usefulness. 
One reason why the concept of embeddedness is so controversial may well be its many 
meanings, which range all the way from simply being a slogan that proclaims the 
superiority of the sociological approach over the economic approach, to a more 
analytical vision, as in Granovetter’s work (Granovetter 1985; cf. Granovetter 1992, 
1995). Polanyi, who invented the term, used embeddedness as part of his attack on 
liberalism and market-oriented approaches more generally. The first half of his 
argument is well known: in pre-capitalist society the economy is integrated into (or 
embedded in) the rest of society, especially in its political and religious institutions; but 
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with the advent of capitalism the economy was separated out and has come to 
dominate the rest of society. The second half of Polanyi’s argument is less known, but 
follows logically from its first half: for society to become healthy again, the economy has 
to be re-embedded or integrated into society. Political and other collective institutions 
have to acquire precedence over the market. 
Through a much cited article in the mid-1980s Granovetter introduced a different and 
analytically more useful concept of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). He first of all 
challenged the political dimension of Polanyi’s ideas by arguing that a pre-capitalist 
economies was just as embedded as a capitalist economy is, in the sense that both are 
social or embedded in the social structure. Secondly, he brought analytical sharpness to 
the concept of embeddedness by insisting that all economic actions are embedded in 
networks of social relations. There is no embeddedness of the economy in general; all 
economic actions take an interpersonal expression; and thanks to network theory, this 
expression can be traced with precision. 
One may finally also speak of a third way in which the term embeddedness is used. This 
may well be the most popular (and least interesting) meaning, since embeddedness 
here is simply synonymous with “social”. The general hostility that sociologists feel 
towards economic analysis may well be at the roots of this usage. Whatever the reason, 
the analytical content of this meaning is close to zero. 
Critics of the embeddeness approach in its strongest version (that is, in the version that 
Granovetter represents) have pointed out that it ignores the political and cultural 
dimensions of society; that it is unable to handle economic phenomena at the macro 
level; and that the term “embeddedness” is inadequate and confusing as a metaphor 
(e.g. Zukin and DiMaggio 1990, Nee and Ingram 1998, Krippner 2001). To this should 
be added that the embeddedness perspective does not single out and theorize the role 
of interest, and thereby runs the risk of attaching much to importance to the role of 
social relations in economic life. 
 What nonetheless makes the concept of embeddedness quite useful, many 
economic sociologists argue, is its close links to network theory. This type of method, 
which has become popular in current economic sociology, provides the analyst with a 
metric to analyze social interactions, including economic ones (for a technical 
introduction, see e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994). Through its reliance on a method 
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with a strikingly visual dimension, network theory also provides the researcher with a 
tool that can quickly communicate complex social relations.  
A special mention should also be made of a European version of networks theory, so-
called actor-network-theory (ANT), which is considerably less technical than 
conventional networks theory of the type that is popular in the United States (e.g. Callon 
1989, Law and Hassard 1999). The basic idea here is that not only individuals and firms 
can be actors but also objects. What is meant with this paradoxical statement is that the 
analysis must not exclusively focus on social relations but also include objects; and the 
rationale for this is that objects can be part of social interactions or steer social 
interaction in some special direction. As examples one can mention the way that, say, 
surveillance technology enables supervisors to track employees or how an assembly line 
presupposes that the workers coordinate their actions in a certain way.   
Studies by economic sociologists that draw on conventional networks theory cover a 
host of different topics. One of these has to do with interlocks or the links between 
corporations that are created when directors are members of more than one boards. 
While big hopes were initially attached to this type of study, it has by now been realized 
that interlocks do not automatically translate into control or cooptation, but rather 
constitute potentially important conduits of communication between corporations – 
which in some cases may mean control or cooptation (Mizruchi 1996, forthcoming).  
Firms can also be connected in the form of business groups – a topic that has been 
pioneered by economic sociologists and by Granovetter in particular (1994, 
forthcoming). Business groups can be defined as “sets of legally separate firms bound 
together in persistent formal and/or informal ways” (Granovetter forthcoming:1). They 
are located somewhere on a spectrum between firms that are bound together by short-
term strategic alliances and firms that are legally to be considered a single entity. 
Business groups play a major role in many economies around the world, such as India, 
Japan, China and Taiwan. Their absence in the United States Granovetter ascribes to 
anti-trust legislation. 
Networks theory is not only a handy tool for analyzing corporate actors and their 
interactions but also individuals. Ronald Burt, for example, has suggested that the 
entrepreneur can be conceptualized as a person who connects two groups of people 
(say, sellers and buyers), who otherwise would be disconnected (Burt 1993). In his 
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capacity as a middleman, the entrepreneur straddles a so-called “structural hole”, in 
Burt’s terminology. Economic sociologists have also shown that consumers not only use 
their personal networks to gather information about buyers and sellers, but also select 
buyers and sellers from their personal networks in certain situations (DiMaggio and 
Louch 1998). Consumers use their friends and acquaintances in particular when it comes 
to acquiring second-hand cars and real estates where no realtor is involved.           
 That the concept of embeddedness can be used to analyze what happens at the 
interface of the economy and politics is clear from what has already been said. Polanyi 
himself, for example, developed the concept of embeddedness precisely to give voice to 
his discontent with the way that the economic sphere and the political sphere are 
separated from each other in capitalist society. Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness 
is, however, considerably more useful than Polanyi’s ideas on this score and also less 
normative. The reason for their usefulness has much to do with the close link between 
embedddedness and networks analysis in Granovetter’s work. This can be illustrated by 
a study of one of Granovetter’s students of the role that PACs play in U.S. political life 
(Mizruchi 1992). There also exists an interesting study of the skill with which the Medici 
family activated and deactivated various networks in order to consolidate their political 
and economic power in renaissance Florence (Padgett and Ansell 1993).   
 
# 2. The Field 
 After embeddedness, the concept of field may well be the one that is most 
important concept in contemporary economic sociology. This term denotes a distinct 
area of social space, in which all the relevant actors are influenced by the overall 
structure. This definition is admittedly somewhat vague, and just as embeddedness, the 
concept of field has its critics.    
 There currently exist two versions of the concept of the field: one that has 
emerged in the sociology of organizations in the United States, and another that has 
Pierre Bourdieu as its author. While the they overlap to some extent, these two versions 
are also different on important points. Sociologists of organization basically use the 
concept of field in the sense of an organizational field – that is, to analyze phenomena in 
social life that can be conceptualized as a number of similar and related organizations. A 
field, from this perspective, typically denotes a number of organizations that belong 
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together, either by virtue of directly interacting with one another or because they take 
each other into account in some other way. To cite a standard text in organizational 
sociology: “by organizational field we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:64-5).  Examples of fields include industries, 
professions and nations.  
 For Bourdieu, in contrast, a field is not so much a middle-range concept as an 
integral part of his general theory of society. The field, in all brevity, constitutes together 
with the concepts of habitus and different types of capital (social capital, symbolic 
capital, and so on) the basic building stones of Bourdieu’s theory of society. There exist 
a huge variety of fields in society, according to Bourdieu, such as the fields of art, 
photography, literature, the economy, an industry, a firm, and so on (e.g. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:94-115).  
 The main function of the concept of field, Bourdieu argues, is to represent the 
structure of some part of society. This structure is primarily important in that it assigns a 
specific place to each actor; it also exerts pressure on the actor to remain in his or her 
position. Each field is centered around a specific interest; and the actors in a field all 
basically pursue the same interest – be it prestige in the field of art, market share in an 
industry or personal power in a firm. 
 One advantage with the concept of field, according to its advocates, is that it is 
not restricted to what happens in direct interactions. If you rely primarily on networks 
and the concept of embeddeness, you are restricted to actual interactions, and thereby 
miss the impact of the structure of the field (e.g. Bourdieu 2000:242). But it is also well 
understood in sociology that it is hard to trace the exact impact of a field, and that the 
social mechanisms that translate the power of the overall structure into pressure on the 
actor are often unknown. Even the advocates of “field theory” agree that this is the 
case, though they emphasize that the positive outweighs the negative (e.g. Martin 
2003). 
 Can the concept of the field be of help in addressing issues at the interface of 
the economy and politics? Its advocates in economic sociology say “yes”. While they 
acknowledge that politics constitutes its own distinct field in modern society, just as the 
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economy does, they also note that the political field impinges on the economic field in 
important ways. As an example of this, one may mention Bourdieu’s argument that the 
French state has deeply influenced the country’s construction industry by introducing 
various loans for private home ownership (Bourdieu 2001).  
While Bourdieu may be correct that the concept of field is of help in establishing the 
important influence that the French state has had on the private building section, it is 
not difficult to think of other theoretical approaches that can accomplish the same. It is, 
on the other hand, considerably more difficult to duplicate the results that Neil Fligstein 
gets when he uses the concept of field in The Transformation of Corporate Control 
(1990). Fligstein’s study is centered around an analysis of the one thousand largest 
corporations in the United States from 1880 to the 1980s; and he basically attempts to 
show how their strategies for making a profit has shifted over the years according to a 
specific pattern.  
To some extent Fligstein uses the concept of field in a way that is reminiscent of 
Bourdieu. He similarly argues, for example, that most of the firms in a field looks to the 
most powerful firms as their reference group. But Fligstein also adds a dimension of his 
own to the concept of field, namely that each field is structured in accordance with the 
worldview of the leading firms – what Fligstein terms their “conception of control”. This 
worldview lays out what a successful strategy for making a profit should look like and 
also how competition can be controlled.    
According to Fligstein, there have been four periods with different conceptions of control 
during the last century in the United States; and these are: “direct control of 
competition” (1880-1900), “manufacturing control” (1900-1925), “sales and marketing 
control” (1925-1955) and “finance control” (1955-1980s). During the first period, profit 
was made and markets were held stable through direct control of one’s competitors, 
e.g. with the help of trusts. During the second period, the emphasis was instead on 
controlling the price through power over the whole production process. During the third 
period, the way to exert control shifted to market share; and from the mid-1950s and 
onwards, the firm has increasingly been seen as a money-making machine. Today “the 
shareholder value conception of control” is dominant (e.g. Fligstein and Shin 2004). 
According to this conception of control, the firm is primarily seen as a way of making 
profit for the shareholder. 
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What is interesting about Fligstein’s type of analysis for a discussion of the interface of 
the polity and the economy is that the U.S. state, including the legal system, has often 
played a key role in changing the conception of control. Direct control of competition, 
for example, was stopped by the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the Clayton Act 
(1914); while it was the Depression that put an end to the attempt to control 
competition and profits via the price. Sales and marketing control was ended by the 
Celler-Kefauver Act (1950), in combination with some other factors; and the finance 
conception of control has been laid the foundation for the current shareholder value 
conception of control through the termination of the Glass-Seagall Act (1933) and more 
generally through the deregulation efforts by the Reagan administration and onwards.  
 
# 3: A Sociological Concept of Interest  
While the concepts of embeddedness and field are central to contemporary economic 
sociology, this is not the case with the concept of interest. Sociologists typically ignore 
this concept and happily leave it to the economists. I take a very different stand on this 
issue and argue that in order to advance economic sociology as well as set it on a sound 
foundation, you need to introduce the concept of interests into the sociological analysis.  
The first task in an economic-sociological analysis should be to figure out which interests 
are involved and how the actors attempt to realize their interests, typically with the help 
of social relations. To do this, I argue, you need a sociological concept of interest, and 
such a concept is somewhat different from the concept of interest that is used in 
mainstream economics. The motivation for starting out with interests is nevertheless the 
same: you first of all need to establish the basic motives of the actor or the basic forces 
that drive the actor.  
The emphasis in the type of economic sociology that I advocate should not be on 
rational choice as consistency (to speak with Amartya Sen), but on rational choice as 
interest realization (Sen 1986). What is of primary importance is the existence of an 
interest and that the actor attempts to realize this interest - not that the actor knows 
how to realize his or her interest or that the actor does so in a rational way.  Sen’s 
formal terms for the former type of analysis is “the interest consistency approach”, and 
for the latter “the interest-correspondence approach”. Another reason why the interest-
consistency approach may be less suitable for economic sociology is that the actor’s 
 10
perception of his or her interest is in principle an empirical question. While an actor can 
be in a position to order his or her preferences in a consistent order in certain situations, 
this may not be the case in others.    
While economics and sociology share the insight that interests are essential to the 
analysis of society, they nonetheless differ on a few points. For one thing, economics 
tends to take only one type of interests into account, and that is economic interests (or, 
alternatively, cast non-economic interests directly in the mould of how they treat 
economic interests). Economics also has a tradition of operating with a non-sociological 
concept of interest (which it is currently trying to overcome). Both points need some 
explication. 
While economists tend to cast all interests in the same mould – namely, that of 
economic interest - and to follow the interest-consistency approach, economic 
sociologists who favor an interest-based type of analysis proceed in another way. 
Different types of interests, they argue, cannot be analyzed using the same metric. The 
sociologist has to proceed empirically and in particular investigate how the actors 
perceive their different interests. A religious interest, for example, can be considerably 
stronger than an economic interest in certain situations – and so can a political or an 
erotic interest. The nature of the interest must not to be assumed before the analysis, 
but should be determined through research. While interests are sometimes based in 
human nature, they are only acknowledged and negotiated in society - in their social 
form - and it is this social form that must be established empirically.  
Interests can only be realized through social relations. While the role of social relations 
in explaining economic phenomena is explicitly denied in early neoclassical economics, 
and while it is increasingly acknowledged in today’s mainstream economics, it has been 
at the core of economic sociology from the very beginning. Many difficult problems no 
doubt arise for sociologists by taking this position, and one way to approach these 
would be to make the assumption that interests drive actions, while social relations give 
them their direction. Or to paraphrase Weber’s well-known formulation: 
Not social relations, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. 
Yet very frequently the social structures that have been created by social relations 
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by 
the dynamic of interest. (cf. Weber 1946:280) 
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  One example that can illustrate how the perspective of a sociological concept of 
interest may be of help in analyzing problems at the intersection of politics and the 
economy, can be found in Weber’s theory of political capitalism (see in particular Weber’s  
studies of Antiquity in e.g. Weber 1976; cf. Love 1991). In various writings Weber 
contrasts what he terms rational capitalism to other forms of capitalism, especially 
traditional capitalism and political capitalism. In traditional capitalism, economic interests 
can only be realized through accepted and long-standing forms of interaction (such as 
traditional work forms, non-dynamic competition, slow-moving markets, and so on). In 
rational capitalism, economic interests are primarily realized through impersonal markets, 
with the state in the background, guaranteeing the rules of the market). In political 
capitalism, in contrast, profit is made through contacts in the state or under the direct 
umbrella of the state’s intervention in another country, as in classical imperialism. The 
result is a form of capitalism that is prone to corruption and closely bound to the fortunes 
of the political power. 
 In terms of the social definition of interest, it is also clear that what is seen as an 
economic interest and as a political interest will be quite different in political capitalism 
and in rational capitalism. While in the latter, political interests and economic interests 
tend to oppose each other and be located in different institutions (the state and the 
firms), this is much less the case in political capitalism – even if it is not a question of 
their total merger, as in socialism.        
 
# 4: An Interest-Based Concept of Institutions 
The concept of institution is absolutely indispensable to economic sociology. Even 
though this concept is obviously not unique to economic sociology, it is well worth 
discussing in this chapter since it is increasingly being realized in the different social 
sciences that institutions are playing a key role in society, including the economy. There 
is also the fact that a new approach to the concept of institutions is currently being 
developed in economic sociology – what may be termed an interest-based concept of 
institutions. 
Sociologists have emphasized the role of institutions ever since the birth of sociology; 
and the relevant sociological literature on this concept is consequently enormous. 
Instead of providing an overview (see e.g. Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Stinchcombe 
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1997), I shall only make the following summary observation. While early sociologists 
tended to restrict the concept of institution to central aspects of society (such as politics, 
the economy and the family), recent sociology tends to use it in a much broader sense. 
According to the view of so-called new institutionalism in sociology, pretty much 
anything constitutes an institution, including a dance and a handshake (e.g. Jepperson 
1991). Another key feature in this approach is the emphasis on the role of culture, 
sense-making and the diffusion of distinct models of behavior. New institutionalism 
downplays the concept of interest and instead focuses on those aspects of institutions 
that are not related to interests (e.g. DiMaggio 1988). It is argued, for example, that 
firms are not run in a rational manner; firms just want to appear rational since 
rationality is an important value in contemporary Western culture (e.g. Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; cf. Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  
The new institutionalist view, as I see it, takes the analytical edge out of the concept of 
institution, and is therefore of limited help to economic sociology. For the concept of 
institutions to be useful, I argue, it should be restricted to areas of society where 
interests come into play in an important and direct manner – such as politics, the 
economy and the family. The strength of institutions comes precisely from the fact that 
they channel interests or, to put it differently, that they present dominant models for 
how interests can be realized. These models are also typically seen as legitimate or they 
would not be stable.  
From this perspective institutions are typically enforced by law because of their centrality 
to society. They may be consciously designed – say through a constitution – but usually 
develop in a gradual and largely unintended manner, along the lines first suggested by 
Menger and Hayek (e.g. Menger 1892, Hayek 1982). Since institutions regulate areas of 
society that are of great importance to the individuals, they are often contested. Rather 
than directly reflect interests, they may reflect the outcome of struggles over interests.   
Together with my colleague Victor Nee, I suggest the following definition of an 
institution:  
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An institution may be conceptualized as a dominant system of interrelated 
informal and formal elements—customs, shared beliefs, norms, and rules—which 
actors orient their actions to, when they pursue their interests.2    
In this view, institutions are dominant social structures that provide a conduit for social 
and collective action by facilitating and structuring the interests of actors.  It follows 
from this interest-related definition of institutions that institutional change involves not 
simply  remaking the formal rules in the various centers of society, but the realignment 
of interests, norms and power. Institutions that are seen as legitimate are, to repeat, 
stronger than institutions that are directly based on say force or interest.      
The concept of institutions that is advocated here is especially close to that of Douglass 
North, and Victor Nee and I advocate that economic sociology adopt what we term an 
institutionalist perspective in its analysis (e.g. North 1990). North’s distinction between 
institutions as rules, on the one hand, and organizations as players, on the other, is 
especially useful to our mind; we also agree with North that institutions are related to 
incentive structures.  
But we are also of the opinion that one may proceed further than North on a few crucial 
points. One of these is, to repeat, that the concept of interest should be at the very 
center of what we mean by institution; another is that the current literature on 
institutions makes a much too sharp distinction between actor and structure – to the 
detriment of the understanding of institutions. I shall briefly elaborate on both of these 
points. 
Interests represent the basic forces that drive the individual, and must for this reason 
also be at the very center of the concept of institution. One way of prioritizing interests 
in this context is to conceptualize institutions as dominant models for how interests 
should be realized. The individual who wants to realize her interests will, following this 
approach, typically orient his or her actions to the relevant institution; meaning by this 
that if he or she wants to realize her interests he or she will have to follow the general 
rules or prescriptions for how to behave. The individual may also chose not to follow the 
institutional model, in which case sanctions will typically occur. By emphasizing the 
                                            
2 Victor Nee and I are currently developing an interest related approach to comparative 
institutional analysis at the Center for the Study of Economy and Society at Cornell 
University (see www.economyandsociety.org).  
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independence of the actor (through the notion of “orienting oneself to rules”, rather 
than simply “following rules”), we proceed in the spirit of methodological individualism.  
When one presents the concept of institution as a dominant model for how to realize 
interests, it is important not to emphasize the element of model to the point that the 
individual disappears. The reason for this is that society does not consist of models or 
rules but of ongoing activities, and similarly there are no institutions per se per se but 
only institutions in action. This means that ongoing institutions are invested with the 
power that comes from a number of individuals acting out their patterns of behavior in 
an effort to realize certain interests, and it is precisely this that gives institutions their 
enormous force and importance in society. If institutions are resist change, it is not only 
because models of behavior are hard to change because of inertia (an important topic in 
its own right), but because they are invested with the force that comes from interests-
in-action.           
Can this interest-based concept of institution add to the understanding of what goes on 
at the intersection of politics and economics? The answer is in principle ‘yes’, even 
though it should be emphasized that this concept is currently under construction and 
has not yet been applied to concrete cases in a stringent manner. Nonetheless, it would 
seem clear that introducing interests into the sociological analysis of the interaction 
between politics and economics will first of all augment its realism, primarily by 
emphasizing the strength of the interests involved and the related difficulty in changing 
ongoing institutions. It is also clear that once you underline the importance of interests, 
it becomes even more puzzling how it became possible, at one juncture in modern 
history, to prevent the political ruler from confiscating economic resources at will, and 
set the stage for the modern market economy (e.g. North and Weingast 1989).   
 
Concluding Remarks: On the Continuing Role of the Classics in Economic Sociology  
 In the main text of this chapter I have focused on what I consider to be the two 
most important concepts in contemporary economic sociology (embeddedness, field). I 
have also discussed two new concepts in economic sociology that I consider crucial for 
this field to move ahead (the sociological concept of interest, the interest-based concept 
of institutions). As emphasized in the introduction, there also exist several other 
important concepts that are part of economic sociology, and something needs to be said 
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about these. This is particularly the case with some of the concepts that are associated 
with the early figures in this field. The main reason for drawing the reader’s attention to 
these is that they have proven their usefulness. 
 One of these classical concepts is Max Weber’s concept of economic-social 
action, which is introduced and discussed in Weber’s main theoretical text on economic 
sociology, which is to be found in Economy and Society. This text is a book-long chapter 
entitled “Sociological Categories of Economic Action”, which is still unsurpassed in the 
literature on economic sociology for its theoretical sophistication as well as 
comprehensiveness (Weber 1978:63-211; cf. Swedberg 1998 for an introduction to 
these ideas). What Weber wanted to accomplish with the concept of economic-social 
action was to construct a sociological equivalent to the concept of economic action in 
standard economic analysis. In Weber’s days, it should be noted, mainstream economics 
of the analytical type did not theorize the social dimension of economic action, and 
Weber’s concept of economic-social action should be judged from this perspective.  
In constructing the social dimension of economic action, Weber drew to some extent on 
the insights of the institutionalists, but he was also careful to take the analytical 
economics into account. He essentially defined economic-social action as a type of 
action which (1) has utility as its goal and (2) is also oriented to other actors (Weber 
1978:4, 63). What makes this type of economic action  “social”, Weber explicates, is the 
fact that economic action is oriented to other actors. Similar to what game theory 
several decades later would suggest, an economic relationship can be conceptualized, 
according to Weber, as a situation in which two economic actors orient their actions to 
one another.  
That Weber’s concept of economic-social action can be applied to the intersection of 
economics and politics is clear from the fact that a social action can be oriented to 
several different actors simultaneously. In a complex market deal, for example, the two 
parties may not only orient their behavior to one another but also to the legal order, as 
represented by their lawyers. Weber was also the first to insist that what rational 
capitalism first and foremost needs from the legal system is predictable action; arbitrary 
action by a ruler is incompatible with large and long-term investments.    
A second set of classical concepts that are frequently used in today’s economic sociology 
are reciprocity-redistribution-exchange, as introduced by Polanyi (Polanyi et al 1971). 
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These three ways of organizing the economy, it has increasingly been realized, are 
especially handy in analyzing different economic systems. There is also the fact that 
each concrete economy is typically a mixture of these three types. The modern capitalist 
economy, for example, is centered around the corporate sector, but also has a state-
dominated sector and a household economy. Of Polanyi’s three categories, redistribution 
is clearly the one that is the most useful when it comes to analyzing the role of the state 
in the economy. 
All in all, I think that it is fair to say that economic sociology, while lacking a cohesive 
theoretical core of the type that mainstream economics has, nonetheless has at its 
disposal a number of concepts that are helpful in untangling the impact that social 
relations and social structures may have on the economy. These concepts can also be 
used to approach the interactions between the political sphere and the economic sphere 
in modern society. What is primarily needed to advance economic sociology beyond its 
current state, I have also argued, is to make room for the concept of interest, to make it 
easier to get at the forces that drive the economic actions of individual actors.         
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Appendix 1-2 
Modern or “New Economic Sociology”, Part I 
United States (1980s-) 
 
Programmatic Statement: Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: 
The Problem of Embeddedness” (AJS 1985).  
 
Basic Approach: Core economic phenomena should be analyzed with the help of 
sociology.  Especially helpful in this enterprise are the following three approaches: 
network theory, organization theory and cultural sociology.  
 
Central Theoretical Concepts: “embeddedness”, “the social construction of the 
economy”. 
 
Signs of Institutionalization:  Readers (1992-2001, 2002), undergraduate textbooks 
(2000, 2002, 2003), a handbook (1994, 2nd ed. 2005), ASA Syllabi and Instructional 
Material (1996, 2nd ed. 2002; 3rd ed forthcoming in 2006), Economic Sociology Section at 
ASA (2001-). 
 
Academic Strongholds: SUNY Stony Brook in the 1980s; today Stanford, Cornell, 
Berkeley, Princeton and Northwestern; many business schools (single individuals – not 
courses). 
 
Key People:  Mitchel Abolafia, Sarah Babb, Wayne Baker, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Mary 
Brinton, Ronald Burt, Bruce Carruthers, Gerry Davis, Frank Dobbin, Peter Evans, Neil 
Fligstein, Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, Bai Gao, Gary Gereffi, Mark Granovetter, Mauro 
Guillén, Gary Hamilton, Brooke Harrington, Mark Mizruchi, Victor Nee, Joel Podolny, 
Walter Powell, Martin Rueff, David Stark, Linda Brewster Stearns, Richard Swedberg, 
Brian Uzzi, Harrison White, Viviana Zelizer and Esra Zuckerman. 
 
Important Monographs: Mitchel Abolafia, Making Markets (1998), Sarah Babb, 
Managing Mexico (2001), Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Charismatic Capitalism (1989), Ronald 
Burt, Structural Holes (1992), Bruce Carruthers, City of Capital (1996), Frank Dobbin, 
Forging Industrial Policy (1994), Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control 
(1990) and The Architecture of Markets (2001), Bai Gao, Japan’s Economic Dilemma 
(2001), Mark Granovetter, Getting A Job (1974, 1995), Richard Swedberg, Max Weber 
and the Idea of Economic Sociology (1998), Harrison White, Markets from Networks 
(2002), and Viviana Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money  (1994). 
 
Note: The term “new economic sociology” was coined by Mark Granovetter in a talk at 
the American Sociological Association in Washington, D.C. in 1985. The basic message in 
this talk was that modern economic sociology, as opposed to the “old economic 
sociology” of the 1960s (Parsons, Moore, etc), should focus on core economic 
institutions, such as firms, money and markets.  
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SOURCES OF INSPIRATION: 
American New Economic Sociology; national traditions; single general sociologists, such 
as Bourdieu, Boltanski, Luhmann and Giddens; sociology of science (Bruno Latour and 
others; e.g. Actor-Network-Theory; “epistemic cultures”)  
 
INSTITUTIONAL VEHICLES: 
“Economic Sociology: European Electronic Newsletter” (1999-); section for economic 





FRANCE: Michel Callon, Luc Boltanski-Laurent Thévenot, Philippe Steiner, Frederic 
Lébaron, Bruno Latour (coming soon!)   
ENGLAND: Nigel Dodd, Geoffrey Ingham, Mark Harvey 
GERMANY: Karin Knorr Cetina (also: University of Chicago), Jens Beckert  
HUNGARY: György Lengyel 
ITALY: Carlo Trigilia 
NETHERLANDS: Olav Velthuis 
PORTUGAL: João Peixoto, Rafael Marques. 
SCANDINAVIA: Patrik Aspers, Søren Jagd 
SCOTTLAND: Donald MacKenzie, Alex Preda  
 
MAIN AREAS OF RESEARCH: 
general economic sociology (Bourdieu, Boltanski-Thevenot; also: Steiner, Trigilia, 
Beckert), sociology of finance (“performativity”; Knorr Cetina, MacKenzie, Ingham, 
Dodd); materiality/ANT (Callon, Latour). Also:  sociology of economics (Lebaron, 
Steiner); economy and technology (Callon, Knorr-Cetina, Preda, MacKenzie); sociology 
of art markets (Aspers, Velthuis), inheritance (Beckert), phenomenological economic 




Patrik Aspers, A Market in Vogue (2001), Jens Beckert, Beyond the Market (2002) and 
Unearned Wealth (forthcoming), Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of 
Capitalism (1999, trans. 2005), Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot, De la Justification 
(1987-1991, tr. Forthcoming in 2006), Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the 
Economy (2000, tr. 2005), Michel Callon (ed.), The Laws of the Market (1998), Geoffrey 
Iingham, The Nature of Money (2004), Karin Knorr-Cetina and Alex Preda (eds.), The 
Sociology of Finance (2004), Frederic Lebaron, La Croyance Economique (2000), Niklas 
Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (1988), Carlo Trigilia, Economic Sociology 
(1998, tr. 2002), Olav Velthuis, Talking Prices (2005). 
 
